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What	about	the	Billeter-Jullien	Debate?	And	What	Was	It	about?		
A	Response	to	Thorsten	Botz-Bornstein
Ralph Weber
University	of	Zurich
ralph.weber@access.uzh.ch
No	doubt	Thorsten	Botz-Bornstein	is	right	to	highlight	that	the	debate	of	2006	and	
2007	(if	indeed	it	can	be	called	a	debate1)	between	Jean	François	Billeter	and	Fran-
çois	Jullien	was	particularly	heated.	It	was	to	some	extent	a	personal	affair	 in	that	
both	 protagonists	 overstepped	 the	 scholarly	 bounds	 set	 for	 an	 exchange	 of	 argu-
ments,	 the	heat	at	 times	reaching	 the	boiling	point.	Billeter	 reproached	 Jullien	 for	
no	 less	 than	 instrumentalizing	China,	 fashioned	as	 the	absolute	Other	and	 instru-
mentalized	for	almost	no	other	purpose	than	to	continue	a	philosophical	discourse	
established	by	Jullien	himself,	a	discourse	that	became	ever	more	auto-referential,	
furthering	 only	 the	 most	 dubious	 of	 ideological	 interests.	 In	 one	 passage,	 Billeter	
goes	so	far	as	 to	claim	that,	 rather	 than	allowing	the	“Chinese	authors”	 their	own	
voice	and	letting	them	develop	their	own	arguments,	in	the	end	“it	is	always	him	[i.e.	
Jullien]	who	talks”	(Billeter	2006a,	p.	45).	Regardless	of	just	how	personal	Billeter’s	
opposition	 to	 Jullien	was	meant	 to	be	—	and	at	 least	one	commentator	claims	 that	
beyond	the	polemical	title	the	text	offers	a	“rigorous	argumentation”	(Danjou	2006;	
cf.	also	Zufferey	2006)	—	Jullien	certainly	took	it	personally,	asking	himself	in	his	ri-
poste,	Chemin faisant,	just	why	Billeter	was	so	angry	at	him	(	Jullien	2007,	p.	137).
His	 riposte	 is	marketed	on	 the	 title	 page	 in	big	 letters	 as	 a	 “Réplique à ***,”	
which	is	explained	by	the	series	editors,	Alain	Badiou	and	Barbara	Cassin,	in	terms	
of	the	reaction	to	a	splinter	that	more	often	than	not	swiftly	removed	is	quickly	forgot-
ten	but	that	occasionally	provokes	a	considerable	reflexive	gesture,	of	just	the	kind	
that	Jullien	offers,	thanks	to	***.	A	quote	by	Foucault	precedes	the	text	itself,	reading:	
“There	are	critiques	to	which	one	responds	and	others	to	which	one	gives	a	riposte.	
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Perhaps	wrongly	so,	for	why	not	similarly	lend	an	ear	that	is	attentive	to	incompre-
hension,	to	banality,	to	ignorance	or	to	insincerity?”	Only	once,	at	the	very	beginning	
of	the	text,	is	Billeter’s	name	(by	implication	the	subject	either	of	incomprehension,	
banality,	ignorance,	insincerity,	or	a	combination	of	all	four)	fully	mentioned;	there-
after	only	his	initials,	JFB,	are	used.	Even	until	recently	the	practice	of	giving	the	silent	
treatment	has	persisted,	as	when	Jullien	in	the	interview	with	Martin	and	Spire	simply	
observes	“that	the	sinologists	who	criticize	me	.	.	.	have	themselves	produced	noth-
ing	since	that	critique	—	do	you	need	names?”		(Martin	and	Spire	2011,	p.	209;	italics	
in	 original),	 before	 referring	 the	 reader	 to	 the	 many	 books	 he	 has	 written	 since	
	Chemin faisant.	Needless	to	add,	this	point	is	premised	on	quantity	trumping	quality,	
which	is	at	least	slightly	disconcerting	given	that	Jullien’s	works	have	been	found	as	
early	as	1996	to	be	marked	by	“a	great	deal	of	overlapping	if	not	outright	repetition	
(or	at	least	rewriting)”	(Reding	1996,	p.	162)	—	something	that	apparently	still	is	the	
case	in	his	many	books	“produced”	since	then.
From	 one	 standpoint,	 Botz-Bornstein	 is	 also	 right	 in	 referring	 to	 the	 affair	 as	
mainly	a	French	debate,	 involving	a	 sizable	number	of	participants	and	spanning	
a	considerable	period	of	time,	from	Billeter	and	Jullien’s	1989	and	1990	exchange	
in	the	pages	of	Études chinoises	over	how	to	read	Wang	Fuzhi	(see	Billeter	2006a,	
p.	37	n.	1);	to	several	volumes	on	and	in	co-operative	works	with	Jullien	(	Jullien	and	
Marchaisse	 2000,	 Marchaisse	 2003,	 Cornaz	 and	 Marchaisse	 2004,	 Chartier	 and	
Marchaisse	2005,	Jousset	2006,	and	Serrurier	and	Bricout	2011);	to	the	publication	
of	the	partisan	Oser Construire: Pour Jullien	(Chartier	2007)	and	Billeter’s	answer	to	
it	(Billeter	2007);	to	the	many	discussions	of	Jullien	that	continue	to	take	as	their	start-
ing	point	the	exchange	with	Billeter	(cf.	Keck	2009).	The	text	by	Martin	and	Spire,	for	
instance,	 makes	 ample	 reference	 to	 the	 debate,	 as	 Botz-Bornstein	 mentions,	 and	
speaks	out	in	favor	of	Jullien	(Martin	and	Spire	2011,	pp.	77–97).	Yet,	the	debate	is	
also	the	starting	point	for	Jean	Levi’s	(2011)	recent	criticism	of	Jullien.	Beyond	the	
borders	of	France,	the	debate	has	met	with	some	response	in	Germany,	where	an-
other	partisan	volume	titled	Kontroverse über China: Sino-Philosophie	was	published	
in	2008	and	where	 the	 issues	 separating	Billeter	and	 Jullien	have	been	paralleled	
with	 those	 separating	 the	 so-called	 Bochum	 (Heiner	 Roetz)	 and	 Bonn	 (Wolfgang	
Kubin,	Hans-Georg	Moeller)	schools	of	sinology,	the	latter	being	“the	declared	friend	
of	François	Jullien”	(Kubin	2008,	p.	66).	And	indeed,	from	another	standpoint,	the	
affair	has	not	merely	been	a	French	debate,	but	one	that	has	involved	issues	of	rele-
vance	far	beyond	France	to	concerns	of	sinology	and	philosophy	generally.	To	the	
extent	that	this	is	true,	Botz-Bornstein	is	to	be	congratulated	for	addressing	the	affair	
and	its	continuing	repercussions	in	precisely	such	terms,	namely	as	a	debate	of	more	
general	importance.
But	precisely	what	is	its	more	general	importance?	What	was	—	and	insofar	as	it	
continues,	what	is	—	the	debate	about?	For	Botz-Bornstein,	the	more	general	impor-
tance	of	 the	heated	 French	debate	 is	 twofold	 as	 the	 title	 of	 his	 comment	 already	
makes	fully	clear:	first	as	a	debate	on	comparative	philosophy	and	second	as	a	de-
bate	that	re-enacts	some	long-standing	tensions	between	philology	and	philosophy.	
It	is	at	this	juncture	that	I	finally	would	like	to	disagree.	I	am	not	at	all	persuaded	by	
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these	two	characterizations	of	the	Billeter-Jullien	affair	(and	I	think	that	the	two	char-
acterizations	offer	an	odd	pair,	since	the	latter	is	certainly	not	encompassed	by	the	
former,	but	has	a	much	wider	scope),	and	hence	shall	offer	 in	what	 follows	some	
objections	with	regard	to	each,	before	eventually	pointing	to	some	issues	that	I	would	
rather	 choose	 to	 emphasize	 as	 more	 generally	 important.	 My	 objections	 to	 each	
characterization	differ	in	nature.	I	shall	argue	that	the	French	debate	has	certainly	not	
been	on	comparative	philosophy	in	the	view	of	either	Billeter	or	Jullien	(or	most	of	
the	French	commentators),	while	conceding	that	the	exchange	between	them	can	be	
interpreted	as	one	on	comparative	philosophy,	but	only	if	one	is	ready	to	grant	that	
the	 outright	 rejection	 of	 comparative	 philosophy	 on	 the	 side	 of	 the	 protagonists	
amounts	to	a	contribution	to	comparative	philosophy.	The	point,	obviously,	can	be	
argued	both	ways.	I	shall	then	argue	that	Botz-Bornstein	is	wrong	in	reading	the	de-
bate	as	one	of	philology	versus	philosophy,	particularly	 if	 the	 two	contenders	are	
each	 taken	 to	 represent	one	of	 these	positions	only	 (Billeter	being	 the	philologist,	
Jullien	the	philosopher).	Neither	Billeter	nor	Jullien	endorses	such	a	polar	view.
So	in	what	sense	was	the	debate	about	comparative	philosophy?	To	be	sure,	the	
notion	of	comparative	philosophy	hardly	ever	finds	mention	in	the	French	literature	
that	has	emerged	in	the	wake	of	Billeter’s	Contre François Jullien.	In	France,	the	affair	
has	 largely	been	interpreted	as	one	about	sinology,	or	about	philosophy,	or	about	
politics	far	and	away	beyond	the	disciplinary	concerns	of	each.	Given	the	fact	that	
the	many	English	translations	of	Jullien’s	works	enjoy	quite	some	popularity	in	com-
parative	philosophy	circles,	where	Jullien	is	understood	as	offering	an	attractive	ap-
proach	in	comparative	philosophy,	it	might	be	quite	natural	to	read	the	debate	in	that	
light.	But	the	two	contenders	themselves	do	not	lend	much	support	to	such	a	reading,	
at	least	not	upon	some	closer	examination	of	their	positions.
It	is	true	that	Billeter	argues	against	comparativism,	but	against	one	of	the	kind	
exemplified	by	Feng	Youlan’s	attempt	at	 redefining	“Chinese	 identity	 in	 terms	op-
posed	 to	 an	 assumed	Western	 identity”	 or	 (ignoring	 important	 differences)	 by	 Xu	
Fuguan	and	Mou	Zongsan	(Billeter	2006a,	pp.	21,	33),	or	one	referred	to	as	com-
parative	“for	convenience”	only	(pour la commodité)	(p.	22).	Billeter	offers	no	ex-
plicit	discussion	whatsoever	of	“comparative	philosophy,”	but	quite	a	bit	of	discussion	
on	the	political	implications	of	this	comparativist	position,	which	he	ascribes	to	Chi-
nese	intellectuals	and	which	he	thinks	is	amenable	to	facile	accommodation	within	
the	given	political	system	(p.	23).	Jullien	is	claimed	to	have	adopted	his	conception	
of	“Chinese	thought”	from	these	intellectuals	(including	the	tendency	toward	a	uni-
form	presentation)	(Billeter	2006a,	p.	41),	but	Billeter	is	explicit	about	Jullien’s	iden-
tification	with	“a	comparativism	that	is	his	own”	(un comparatisme qui lui est propre)	
(Billeter	2006a,	pp.	33–34).	With	regard	to	Billeter,	my	point	is	simply	that	even	if	it	
is	admitted	that	he	does	criticise	comparativism	and	that	he	does	think	of	himself	
as	writing	about	philosophy	(as	he	does),	it	is	wrong	to	infer	that	his	Contre François 
Jullien	is	on	comparative	philosophy	in	any	but	the	loosest	sense.
Jullien’s	 position	 over	 against	 comparative	 philosophy	 is	 rather	 complicated,	
but	—	this	is	also	true	—	he	does	at	times	seem	to	subscribe	to	some	such	endeavor	
when	he	refers	to	his	“comparativist	working	site”	(chantier comparatiste),	when	he	
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cites	Ricoeur’s	supportive	qualification	of	his	work	as	“constructing	comparables,”	or	
when	he	describes	his	critical	project	as	interested	in	“the	conditions	of	possibility	of	
thought	in	one	and	the	other	of	these	cultural	areas	[i.e.,	China	and	Europe]”	(	Jullien	
2007,	pp.	85,	96,	38).	Comparison	hereby	plays	an	important	role	for	him	on	various	
levels.	 For	one	 thing,	he	of	course	admits	 to	comparing	all	 the	 time,	 for	 instance	
when	engaging	 in	 translation,	but	he	 is	quick	 to	add	 that	he	 is	 also	keen	 to	 “de-
compare”	(p.	105).	For	another	thing,	his	choice	of	China	is	predicated	on	a	grand	
comparison	with	Europe,	the	result	of	which	is	that	Jullien	takes	both	equally	to	boast	
sophisticated	thought	that	is	textual,	commented,	and	explicated	(pp.	33–34).	This	is	
despite	 China’s	 asserted	 exteriority	 in	 terms	 of	 geography,	 history,	 and	 language,	
which	allows	him	to	formulate	his	program	as	one	of	detour	and	access.	The	com-
monality,	however,	proves	that	Jullien	indeed	is	not	claiming	absolute	exteriority.	In	
this	regard,	Billeter	has	certainly	drawn	too	extreme	a	picture	of	Jullien’s	position.
In	short,	Jullien	at	times	seems	committed	to	comparativism,	but	in	a	way	that	
is	widely	considered	to	be	one	of	a	kind,	by	Billeter	as	much	as	by	Jullien	himself	
(although	Thierry	Meynard	has	described	Liu	Xiaofeng	as	a	“Chinese	 Jullien”	 [see	
Meynard	2008]).	Jullien	sometimes	expresses	his	loneliness	in	the	endeavor	of	taking	
a	detour	through	Chinese	thought	to	access	Greek	and	European	thought,	particu-
larly	those	folds	(des plis)	which	have	not,	and	could	not	possibly	have,	been	thought	
about	(our	un-thought,	notre impensé ),	which	come	into	view	only	when	considered	
from	 a	 distance.	The	 “detour	 and	 access”	 program	 (inspired	 by	 a	 passage	 in	 the	
Sunzi )	sits	uncomfortably	with	a	traditional	view	of	comparison	as	being	about	two	
or	more	comparata	that	are	put	on	a	par	and	equally	subject	to	evaluation.	This	is	
clearly	stated	in	his	writings	from	at	least	as	early	as	his	conclusive	note	on	“What	is	
the	use	of	 comparison?”	 (À quoi sert la comparaison?)	 in	his	Procès ou création,	
where	he	qualifies	his	comparativism	as	“essentially	fictive”	and	devoted	to	a		“purely	
heuristic	project”	 (	Jullien	1989,	pp.	312–313).	 In	his	more	 recent	writings,	 Jullien	
has	made	it	even	clearer	that	he	is	not	pursuing	a	comparative	approach	along	any	
of	the	more	conventional	ways.	He	has	come	to	distance	himself	from	“comparing”	
altogether:
“Comparer,”	c’est	—	le	sait-on?	—	une	autre	façon	de	ne	pas	se	déplacer:	de	ne	pas	quitter,	
donc	de	ne	pas	entrer.	Car	on	est	demeuré	dans	ses	catégories	de	départ,	formant	sur-
plomb,	à	partir	desquelles	on	range;	l’hétérotopie	et	le	dépaysement	n’ont	pas	joué.
“To	compare,”	that	is	—	is	it	known?	—	another	way	of	not	travelling:	of	not	leaving,	and	
therefore	of	not	entering.	Since	one	has	remained	within	one’s	initial	categories,	consti-
tuting	 an	 excess,	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 which	 one	 introduces	 order;	 no	 heterotopy	 and	 no	
change	of	scenery	has	occurred.	(	Jullien	2012a,	p.	29)
Linking	comparison	to	the	concept	of	difference,	Jullien	further	parts	with	any	
and	 all	 comparativism	 and	 embraces	 more	 strongly	 than	 in	 his	 earlier	 work	 the	
	concept	of	distance-deviation	(l’écart);	difference	is	declared	a	concept	of	“putting	
into	order”	 (rangement)	 and	one	 that	 is	not	 “adventurous”	 (aventureux),	whatever	
that	is	supposed	to	mean	(	Jullien	2012b,	pp.	28–29).	Jullien	explains	that	difference	
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establishes	a	distinction	and	remains	on	the	level	of	description,	whereas	deviation	
(l’écart)	proceeds	from	a	distance	and	is	productive	(pp.	32,	34).	In	other	words:
Par	 suite,	 tandis	 que	 la	 différence	 est	 bien	 le	 maître-outil	 des	 nomenclatures	 et	 des	
	typologies	—	,	l’écart	est	un	concept	exploratoire,	à	fonction	heuristique.	Si	la	différence	
est	spécifiante,	déterminante,	l’écart,	quant	à	lui,	est	inventif.	À	la	différence	de	l’autre,	
c’est	un	concept	aventureux.
Therefore,	whereas	difference	is	 the	master	 tool	of	 lists	and	typologies,	deviation	is	an	
explorative	concept	and	serves	a	heuristic	function.	If	difference	is	specifying	and	deter-
mining,	deviation	is	itself	inventive.	Unlike	the	other,	it	is	an	adventurous	concept.	(p.	35)
That	should	make	the	difference	(!)	between	difference	and	deviation	clearer.	 It	 is	
against	this	background	that	Jullien	“does	not	pretend	to	‘compare’”	or	—	without	the	
use	of	inverted	commas	and	more	straightforwardly	—	“does	not	compare”	other	than	
temporarily	and	being	limited	in	scope	(2012b,	pp.	34,	59).	What	the	deviation	ap-
proach	produces	according	to	Jullien	is	the	tool	of	in-betweenness	(l’entre),	which	
allows	him	“to	circulate	between	the	thoughts	of	China	and	Europe”	(p.	60).
This	amounts	to	a	shift	in	emphasis	in	Jullien’s	recent	work	—	somewhat	(inciden-
tally?)	more	conspicuous	since	the	affair	with	Billeter	—	that	has	far-reaching	implica-
tions	as	it	involves	a	departure	from	the	“detour	and	access”	program	(or	at	least	a	
dynamization	of	it).	Jullien	now	no	longer	wishes	to	take	up	a	position	of	heterotopy,	
but	rather	one	of	atopy	(a	term	Foucault	also	uses	in	his	The Order of Things),	which	
he	finds	better	suits	the	new	emphasis	on	in-betweenness	(	Jullien	2012b,	pp.	61–62).	
Despite	all	of	this,	Jullien	continues	to	understand	his	program	as	“an	alternative	to	
how	the	plurality	of	cultures	may	be	considered”	(p.	24),	and	as	far	as	that	consider-
ation	also	features	prominently	in	comparative	philosophy	(in	the	view	of	many	in	
the	field),	it	might	perhaps	be	fair	in	turn	to	understand	Jullien’s	program	as	an	alter-
native	to	comparative	philosophy.	Whether	or	not	that	makes	his	approach	(let	alone	
the	debate	with	Billeter)	one	on	comparative	philosophy	is	in	my	view	a	conceptual	
question	and	ultimately	undecidable.	Given	his	explicit	departure	from	the	concept	
of	comparison,	I	would	argue	that	Jullien’s	writings	(and	the	debate	with	Billeter)	are	
not	about	comparative	philosophy.	 In	 fact,	 it	 is	quite	obvious	that	what	he	wishes	
them	to	be	about	simply	is	philosophy:	no	qualifying	adjective	required.	He	under-
stands	himself,	as	he	has	made	it	clear	many	times,	as	following	in	the	footsteps	of	
Heidegger,	Levinas,	and	Derrida,	but,	stuck	as	these	philosophers	are	in	European	
thought,	 he	 rather	 embarks	 on	 a	 deconstruction	 from	 without	 (déconstruction du 
dehors),	 thus	creating	 tensions	 that	alone	he	claims	are	able	 to	 revive	philosophy	
(2012b,	p.	60).	It	is	thus	that	Jean-Marie	Schaeffer	can	come	to	think	of	Jullien’s	work	
as	no	less	than	“one	of	the	most	decisive	contributions	to	contemporary	philosophi-
cal	 thought	at	 the	international	 level”	 (Schaeffer	2003,	p.	77).	For	reasons	that	 for	
lack	of	space	I	cannot	explicate	here,	I	do	not	share	Schaeffer’s	enthusiastic	assess-
ment	(cf.	Weber	forthcoming	in	2014).
The	second	characterization	of	 the	debate	that	Botz-Bornstein	offers	 is	 framed	
along	 and	 likened	 to	 historical	 clashes	 “between	 philologists	 and	 philosophers.”	
Compared	to	Jullien,	Billeter	is	described	as	“an	old-school	philologist	who	knows	
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his	Chinese	 and	his	 classics”	but	 has	only	modest	 ambitions	 “to	 enter	 a	 genuine	
philosophical	 discussion.”	The	 positions	 are	 clearly	 distributed,	 Billeter	 being	 the	
philologist	and	Jullien	the	philosopher,	while	both	are	considered	to	be	sinologists.	
This	allows	Botz-Bornstein	 to	 frame	 their	debate	as	a	 re-enactment	of	 the	 famous	
clash	between	von	Wilamowitz-Moellendorf	and	Nietzsche.	That	this	is	just	one	of	
many	possible	frames	must	be	clear	to	Botz-Bornstein;	he	himself	mentions	Keck’s	
framing	 of	 the	 debate	 as	 being	 similar	 to	 the	 “attacks	 by	 French	 enlightenment	
	thinkers	on	Jean-Jacques	Rousseau,”	which	can	hardly	be	called	a	debate	of	philol-
ogy	versus	philosophy.	Billeter	himself,	in	his	response	to	Oser construire: Pour Jul-
lien,	 frames	his	exchange	with	 Jullien	as	one	between	Arendt	 (a.k.a.	Billeter)	 and	
Heidegger	(a.k.a.	Jullien)	and	what	he	sees	as	their	different	attitudes	on	political	re-
sponsibility	(Billeter	2007,	pp.	68–69).
Given	that	there	are	probably	always	many	frames	through	which	to	view	such	a	
debate,	the	question	to	ask	is:	just	how	useful	is	the	frame	of	philology	versus	phi-
losophy	 for	 understanding	 what	 the	 Billeter-Jullien	 debate	 has	 been	 about?	To	 be	
sure,	neither	Billeter	nor	Jullien	follows	that	frame	directly.	Jullien,	for	instance,	ends	
his	recent	book	Entrer dans une pensée	(	Jullien	2012a)	with	a	note	explaining	why	
he	did	not	include	in	the	text	any	references	to	sources	drawn	upon	(his	answer,	by	
the	way,	is	that	he	would	have	had	to	append	a	note	to	almost	every	line).	In	this	
explanation,	he	writes	that	he	trusts	the	reader	to	have	understood	the	character	of	
his	text,	which	is	a	“Manifesto	of	Sinology,	at	the	same	time	philological	and	philo-
sophical”	(p.	187).	With	regard	to	Billeter,	nothing	is	more	telling	than	that	Zufferey	
(2006),	evaluating	Contre François Jullien,	comes	to	think	that	one	might	reproach	
Billeter	with	being	too	much	of	a	philosopher	and	too	little	of	a	historian,	sometimes	
“more	philosopher	than	philologist”	(parfois plus philosophe que philologue).	What	
should	we	make	of	these	varying	attributions	of	philology	and	philosophy?	It	seems	
to	me	that	we	are	dealing	with	a	variety	of	understandings	of	what	philology	and	
philosophy	are	each	about	and	how	they	relate.	But,	as	Botz-Bornstein	makes	it	in	his	
title	 and	 in	 the	 allusion	 to	 the	 clash	 between	 von	 Wilamowitz-Moellendorf	 and	
	Nietzsche,	to	make	this	a	question	of	either-or	seems	not	very	useful.	Viewed	more	
closely,	 it	 is	also	not	what	Botz-Bornstein	himself	does,	 for	what	he	puts	opposite	
each	other	is	not	philology	and	philosophy,	but	rather	“old	philology”	(Billeter)	and	
“genuine	philosophy”	(	Jullien).
There	are	two	consequences	that	this	kind	of	framing	of	the	debate	brings	about.	
For	 one	 thing,	 it	 allows	 Botz-Bornstein	 to	 claim	 some	 high	 philosophical	 ground	
from	which	 to	portray	“Billeter’s	convictions”	as	outdated,	as	“unusual	 in	a	post–
World	War	 II	world”	 (even	 in	 terms	of	ordinary	 “high	 school	education”),	 and	as	
lacking	 understanding	 of	 “what	 hermeneutic	 philosophy	 has	 attempted	 to	 clarify	
since	the	early	nineteenth	century.”	This	strikes	me	as	unnecessarily	polemical	and	
also	mistaken.	 If	 there	 is	any	consensus	on	 the	question	of	“genuine	philosophy,”	
then	 it	 is	 that	 there	 is	no	consensus	whatsoever.	Simply	 to	declare	New	Criticism	
to	be	 the	new	philology	and	 to	equate	 some	 sort	of	poststructuralist-hermeneutic	
view	of	philosophy	with	genuine	philosophy	begs	the	question.	Portraying	the	debate	
in	the	overly	polar	 terms	of	philology	versus	philosophy	cannot	have	other	results	
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than	that	Billeter	and	Jullien	are	either	speaking	past	each	other	or	that	Billeter	is	in-
deed	no	real	opponent	 to	 Jullien,	as	 the	 latter	claims	 in	 the	 final	sentences	of	his	
	riposte.	Botz-Bornstein	seems	to	follow	Jullien’s	opinion	also	in	this	regard.	Although	
admitting	that	“Billeter	addresses	some	important	points,”	Botz-Bornstein	does	not	
elaborate	these	points,	but	in	conclusion	hints	at	some	other	criticism	not	advanced	
by	Billeter.	In	my	opinion,	Botz-Bornstein’s	framing	of	the	debate	as	one	between	old	
philology	and	genuine	philosophy	and	his	siding	with	Jullien	fails	to	make	the	debate	
philosophically	attractive.	The	debate	seems	easily,	all	too	easily,	decidable.	But,	and	
that	is	the	second	consequence,	viewing	the	debate	through	such	a	frame	if	anything	
detracts	from	the	issues	that	are	indeed	of	more	general	importance	and	that	are	not	
so	easily	decidable.
To	end	this	essay,	I	should	therefore	like	to	highlight	some	of	these	issues	briefly.	
One	of	them	has	to	do	with	the	meaning	of	“China”	in	the	French	debate	as	much	as	
in	the	philosophical	discourse	somehow	considered	to	be	about	“China”	or	drawing	
on	“China.”	This	latter	distinction	indicates	a	tension,	for	whoever	simply	draws	on	
“China”	does	not	mean	to	advance	claims	about	“China,”	and	a	dilemma,	for	draw-
ing	on	“China”	in	some	sense	is	drawing	on	something	that	cannot	be	completely	
unrelated	to	“China,”	and	hence	involves	some	sort	of	claim	about	“China.”	This	is,	
I	believe,	a	major	problem	in	Jullien’s	work,	which	Billeter	has	also	pointed	out,	call-
ing	it	a	“fundamental	ambiguity”	and	an	attempt	at	wanting	to	have	one’s	cake	and	
eat	it	too,	that	is,	“to	uncover	the	un-thought	(l’impensé)	of	our	philosophical	tradi-
tion	by	drawing	on	Chinese	thought	and	at	the	same	time	to	maintain	a	general	dis-
course	about	Chinese	 thought”	 (Billeter,	2007,	pp.	67–68).	Botz-Bornstein	merely	
replicates	 the	 problem	 in	 his	 comment	 when	 he	 speculates	 that	 “the	 majority	 of	
	Jullien’s	 readers	will	 confirm	 that	China	has	become	more	 familiar	 to	 them	 in	 its	
otherness	through	these	books.”	This	is	an	empirical	statement,	and	insofar	as	it	is	
true,	 it	 is	 certainly	 true	 enough.	 But	 it	 is	 also	 a	 fact	 that	 the	 majority	 of	 Jullien’s	
	readers	seem	not	particularly	acquainted	with	“China,”	at	least	judging	by	the	many	
non-sinological	voices	speaking	out	in	favor	of	Jullien	in	the	French	debate,	among	
them	 philosophers	 of	 course,	 but	 also	 anthropologists	 (not	 working	 on	 “China”),	
psychoanalysts,	et	cetera	(with	the	notable	exceptions	of	Léon	Vandermeersch	and	
Kubin).	It	is	also	unclear	what	that	“China”	should	be	that	supposedly	becomes	more	
familiar	 by	 reading	 Jullien’s	 books.	 Following	 Jullien’s	 heterotopical	 “China,”	 it	
should	be	one	rooted	in	pre-seventeenth-century	Chinese	texts.
Yet,	 the	 situation	 is	 further	complicated	by	 Jullien’s	occasional	 insistence	 that	
the	concepts	he	gleans	from	these	texts	do	tell	us	something	about	“contemporary	
China,”	which	in	these	instances	certainly	does	not	refer	to	the	Borges-like	hetero-
topical	“China”	of	the	“detour	and	access”	program.	This	is	also	manifest	in	his	use	
of	the	notion	of	déplacement,	which	is	part	of	Jullien’s	philosophical	strategy	based	
on	earlier	Chinese	texts	and	which	he	claims	to	have	undertaken,	referring	to	his	stay	
in	 the	Shanghai	and	Beijing	of	 the	1970s	 (see	 Jullien	2007,	p.	40).	What	we	 take	
“China”	 to	be	 in	philosophical	discourse	 is	an	 issue	 related	 to	a	number	of	other	
problematiques	 addressed	 in	 the	 debate,	 such	 as	 how	 much	 context	 and	—	more	
	importantly	—	which	context	is	relevant,	or	the	relation	of	philosophy	(and	philology)	
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to	politics.	These	are	all	tough	issues,	and	thinking	that	either	Billeter	or	Jullien	has	
better	points	with	regard	to	any	of	them	does	not	make	the	issues	disappear.	It	is	also	
unlikely	that	one	of	them	should	have	better	points	with	regard	to	all	of	them.	Botz-
Bornstein	mentions	only	in	passing	that	Billeter	has	some	important	points	and	that	
Jullien’s	work	deserves	some	criticism.	Compared	to	the	beginning	of	his	text,	when	
he	offers	a	useful	disentanglement	of	Billeter’s	critique	and	mentions	that	this	allows	
for	agreement	with	some	but	not	all	points,	Botz-Bornstein	later	fails	to	elaborate,	but	
over	and	over	tells	us	how	mistaken	Billeter	is	and	how	much	more	interesting	Jullien	
is.	 I	 would	 have	 loved	 to	 read	 more	 about	 Billeter’s	 important	 points	 and	 Botz-	
Bornstein’s	criticism	of	Jullien	than	merely	to	be	presented	with	a	framing	of	the	de-
bate	that	makes	it	appear	as	the	re-enactment	of	a	clash	that	even	at	the	time	when	
it	occurred,	that	is,	in	the	1870s,	was	considered	to	be	highly	polemical	and	an	in-
stance	of	protagonists	mainly	talking	past	each	other.
Note
1			–			Philippe	Nassif	has	pointed	out	 that	 the	affair	 can	hardly	be	called	a	debate,	
since	Jullien	was	content	only	to	rectify	the	errors	of	Billeter,	to	reaffirm	his	own	
method,	 and	 to	 scorn	 his	 opponent	 for	 exposing	 “weak	 thought”	 (	Jullien’s	
	second-last	 chapter	 in	 his	 riposte	 is	 titled	 “Requiem pour une pensée faible”	
[Requiem	for	a	weak	thought];	see	Nassif	2007).	A	debate	perhaps	more	worthy	
of	the	name	was	the	one	between	Fava	and	Billeter	in	Études chinoises	in	2006;	
see	Fava	2006	and	Billeter	2006b.
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Reply	to	Ralph	Weber
Thorsten Botz-Bornstein
I	still	believe	that	this	is	a	debate	about	philology	and	philosophy,	and	Dr.	Weber	has	
not	convinced	me	that	Billeter	is	in	any	way	more	philosophical.	“Framing”	has	al-
ways	had	a	metaphorical	character	and	its	only	purpose	is	 to	highlight	some	(cer-
tainly	subjective)	points.	They	are	subjective	especially	since	they	echo	(as	I	explain)	
my	personal	observations	of	 how	philosophy	 is	 often	dealt	with	 today	within	 the	
larger	field	of	the	human	sciences.	Weber’s	question	“Which	China	is	Jullien	actu-
ally	talking	about?”	is	precisely	one	of	those	questions	that	philosophers	are	asked	by	
those	more	empirically	minded	humanists.	 I	 try	 to	make	clear	 that	within	certain	
abstract,	philosophical	contexts,	such	questions	have	less	importance.	It	is	thus	not	
very	useful	to	point	out	that	the	frame	does	not	always	fit	in	a	literal	sense.	The	frame	
could	have	been	called	“empirical	versus	 speculative”	 (speculatio	being	 the	Latin	
translation	of	theoria),	which	would	have	eliminated	references	to	concrete	events	in	
the	history	of	philosophy.
It	is	also	true	that	Jullien	has	attempted	to	design	his	own	methodology,	which	he	
wants	at	times	to	push	beyond	the	limits	of	the	traditional	“comparative”	program,	
but	seen	through	a	wider	and	international	lens	Jullien’s	writings	still	overlap	very	
much	with	comparative	philosophy.
The	purpose	of	my	comment	was	not	to	give	grades	to	Billeter	and	Jullien	and	
evaluate	their	merits	in	sinology,	but	to	draw	attention	to	a	problem	that	concerns	
philosophy	and	the	humanities	in	general.
